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SPACE FOR TOURISM?
Legal Aspects of Private Spaceflight for Tourist Purposes
Frans G. von der Dunk
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden - The Netherlands
F.G.vonderDunk@law.leidenuniv.nl

Abstract
It is barely five years ago since the first
space tourist proper, Mr. Dennis Tito,
made his much-publicised 20 milliondollar flight to the ISS. And now,
purportedly thousands of prospective
customers are lining up with such
nascent companies as Sir Richard
Branson's Virgin Galactic, for a
200,000-dollar, few-minute flight into
the nearest part of outer space. In other
words: it looks like space tourism is
here to stay.
This obviously raises a number of key
legal issues, stretching from proper
application of such international space
treaties
as
the
Liability and
Registration Conventions to national
legal issues pertaining to liabilities,
licensing and certification, and civil
and criminal jurisdiction and control.
The present paper seeks to offer an
overview of some of these, the most
salient legal issues as they are on the
table right now, keeping in mind the
need to maintain a fair balance between
the interests of private enterprise and of
the public at large – nationally as well
as internationally – respectively.

science fiction to an impending
commercial business. If the flight of
Mr. Tito in 2001 could still be
considered an exotic multi-millionaire’s
stunt, already three years later the Xprize changed such perceptions
dramatically. Twice within a few weeks
in that October of 2004 did a privatelyfinanced craft, using relatively simple
but rather revolutionary technology,
reach an altitude of over 100 km, the
unofficial boundary of outer space. The
technology has immediately been
picked up by Virgin Galactic, which
about half a year ago already had some
43,000 bookings and down-payments to
the tune of 13 million US$ for trips to
be offered as of 2008.1
While the US government has reacted
by enunciating a specific Act to deal
with this latest development,2 this Act
was only a temporary one.3 Moreover,
it is clear that space tourism will also
generate substantial legal issues beyond
the borders and jurisdiction of the
United States – already in the case of
Virgin Galactic it should be noted that
this concerns a UK company.
The present paper offers a summary
overview of some of the most salient
legal issues as they play out both at an
international and at a national level.

1. Introduction
Over the span of just a handful of years,
space tourism (for the moment to be
defined as “flights into outer space of
humans for their own pleasure and
excitement”) has been transformed
from a notion being little more than

2. International level
2.1. Introductory remark
Starting at the international level – as
should be the case, bearing in mind the
fundamentally international character
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of outer space as an area4 – it is
immediate obvious that spaceflights for
pure pleasure purposes were never as
such envisaged by the drafters of the
key space treaties.

In view of that fact of life, it was
simply not very likely the astronaut
would even get the chance to undertake
any deliberate action in violation of
domestic laws potentially triggering the
receiving state’s jurisdiction and, thus,
the question of any immunities.
The relevant provisions were, of
course, drafted keeping in mind humans
going into space as ‘professionals’, that
is trained and paid by their respective
governments (or exceptionally by an
intergovernmental organisation, read
ESA) to go into outer space. Hence, it
was precisely the fundamental nonprofessional nature of space tourists
which raised the issue in many minds
of whether they should be considered
astronauts and hence enjoy the status of
the relevant provisions.
The ‘follow-up’ treaties to the Outer
Space Treaty equally proceeded on that
basis, although in view of the more
explicit and concrete character of most
of their articles the question whether
individual articles would impose
relevant conditions on space tourist
activities became much more acute.

2.2. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty was essentially
focused on two reasons for conducting
any, including manned, spaceflight:
military/political ones (where it tried to
minimise the risks of space becoming a
battleground) and scientific ones
(where it tried to establish and protect
the freedom to investigate, explore and
even use outer space).5 With a view to
space tourism, the major conclusion too
be drawn from the Outer Space Treaty
therefore is: as long as no specific rules
prohibit or condition (certain forms of)
space tourism, the freedom of use of
outer space as point of departure allows
space tourism as part of such use, even
if nowhere specifically mentioned.
The only more directly relevant
reference to the current issue is offered
by Article V, which had been drafted to
ensure that astronauts (and cosmonauts
and taikonauts) would be treated in
conformity with certain standards – as
mainly expressed by the concept of
“envoys of mankind”. That concept had
never been defined any further,
although it was generally considered
not to equate in law with an ‘envoy’ in
the terrestrial, diplomatic sense of the
word.
Formally,
no
diplomatic
immunities were offered to an astronaut
stranded in a foreign country. Under
Article V, the duties of the ‘receiving
state’ had been ‘limited’ to assistance
as well as prompt and safe return to his
‘sending’ state; they did not provide for
any formal entitlement of the astronaut
to immunity from jurisdiction. To be
sure, the astronaut’s presence within a
foreign jurisdiction was essentially of
an emergency and – as a consequence –
supposedly rather temporary character.

2.3. The Rescue Agreement
This firstly concerned the Rescue
Agreement6, which elaborated Article
V of the Outer Space Treaty. The
Rescue Agreement followed the latter’s
exclusive focus on professional
astronauts and even seemed to
elaborate it, by referring throughout to
“personnel of a spacecraft” as enjoying
the rights of being assisted and safely
and promptly returned as spelled out by
the Agreement.7 Not entering into the
discussion here of the extent to which
the “personnel of a spacecraft” of the
Rescue Agreement would equate with
the “astronauts” of Article V of the
Outer Space Treaty, it remains obvious
that as such space tourists would seem
to fall outside of that category.
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Apparently, there is considerable
hesitation to accept this conclusion
outright, as it may seem to deny space
tourists the benefits of Articles 1
through 4 in particular of the Rescue
Agreement, and efforts are made to
stretch the concepts of ‘personnel of a
spacecraft’ and ‘astronaut’ so as to
include, after all, any human being in
outer space including space tourists.
This would be a fallacy, however,
inasmuch as general humanitarian
duties to assist human beings in distress
do not depend on those Articles; they
derive – apart from moral and ethical
considerations – from customary and in
many cases also codified general
international law. It is not necessary for
those general humanitarian purposes to
interpret these Articles as extending to
space tourists as well.
On the contrary, should space tourists
be allowed to enjoy in particular the
rights to safe and prompt return
provided for by Article 4 without any
caveat as to the possibility of those
tourists somehow infringing national
laws? That would seem to be a
proposition which many, in particular
non-space-faring, states would not
particularly agree with – but at any rate,
sufficient doubts may be cast on the
validity of the claim that space tourists
should enjoy the same international
legal protection as personnel or
astronauts under the current treaties
without further ado, to warrant an effort
to somehow clarify the matter on the
international plane.
With regard to the flight crew,
however, things would seem to lie less
clear. Both their reasons for going into
outer space (professional and being
paid to do a job) and the types of their
activities there (guiding the vehicle
safely in and out of outer space, and in
the case of orbital tourism, even
guiding it around in outer space) are
much closer to those of the 500 or so

human beings that have so far entered
into outer space. The only major
difference, certainly from a legal
perspective, is that the latter are in the
service of governments or an
intergovernmental organisation, the
former in the service of private
commercial companies.
In this case, therefore, it would make
sense to equate space tourist vehicle
crew, certainly the flight deck crew but
possibly also any service e crew on
board, to “personnel of a spacecraft”,
hence endowing them with the rights
enunciated by the Rescue Agreement.
2.4. The Liability Convention
Another example of outer space treatylaw potentially relevant for the present
situation would concern the Liability
Convention,8 since the obvious risk
exists that through the doings of a space
tourist damage falling within its scope
might result. As a matter of fact,
however, for the Liability Convention
itself it does not make any distinction
whether the ultimate cause of damage
would be a tourist or not – the state or
states qualifying under the well-known
criteria as “launching State” of the
object which caused the damage will be
liable.9
As a consequence, just like with respect
to any other private space activity for
which a particular state may be held
liable on the international level, that
state simply has to ensure that the
relevant tourist activity is subjected to
its jurisdiction and a license including
proper arrangements regarding third
party liabilities and insurance therefor.
In other words: it becomes a matter of
national (space) law and any applicable
licensing system part thereof.
The only issue on which space tourism,
even if de facto and for the time being,
might be special concerns sub-orbital
tourism and the craft used therefore. As
is well-known, the application of the
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Liability Convention’s regime hinges
on the damage being caused by a ‘space
object’.10 While a space object has not
been defined any further by the treaties,
it is generally perceived as something
which was at least intended to be
launched into outer space.
As has been discussed abundantly
elsewhere, there is no clear legal
delimitation of outer space as of yet.
This fact opens the door to a discussion
as to whether flights going up vertically
to an altitude of at most 120 km – as
Virgin Galactic is currently planning to
do with its SpaceShipTwo vehicles
being built – and then immediately
returning would qualify SpaceShipTwo
craft as space objects so as to trigger
the application of the Liability
Convention in case of damage. As will
be seen, this actually transposes the
issue to the level of national law.

the craft at issue would be subject to the
jurisdiction of the state that could have
registered it – and might prefer other
legal instruments to make the exercise
of any jurisdiction effective.
It is furthermore with respect to such
space objects – again not defined any
further by the Convention itself – that
the duty of the state of registry arises
under the Registration Convention to
establish a national registry and then
inform the United Nations SecretaryGeneral, read the Office for Outer
Space Affairs about such registered
space object on at least a handful of
parameters
offered
by
the
13
Convention.

3. National law issues
3.1. Introductory remarks
As is the case on many other issues
where international space law is not
sufficiently elaborated, as soon as a
practical need arises for certain states to
deal in legal terms with an issue,
attention automatically should be
directed towards national legal actions
and developments – and space tourism,
obviously is no exception.
As has been discussed in many
instances elsewhere, the fundamental
basis for the role of national law and
jurisdiction vis-à-vis space activities
fundamentally derives from three
parameters at the international level,
which warrant being briefly reiterated
here.
Firstly, there is the international
responsibility of a state under Article
VI of the Outer Space Treaty for
“national activities in outer space”, and
the related obligation to exercise
“authorization
and
continuing
supervision” over private entities
involved therein. Secondly, the
international liability for damage by
space objects also if ultimately caused

2.5. The Registration Convention
Similar considerations as regards the
Liability Convention apply to Article
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the
Registration Convention11 as its
elaboration, since the definition of a
‘space
object’
through
the
determination of the ‘launching State’
underlies any retention of jurisdiction
by the state of registry over that space
object and its personnel while in outer
space. In other words: if a craft carrying
space tourists (or anything else for that
matter) into the outer edge of outer
space and back would qualify as a
‘space object’, jurisdiction of the state
of registry could be applied through the
workings of Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty and Article II(2) of the
Registration Convention.
The difference is not really relevant,
however, as otherwise basically the
same amount of jurisdiction could be
exercised under air law over the craft if
it would be defined as an aircraft,12 or
even in the absence of such registration
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by private actors, which results for
(launching) states as a consequence of
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty
and the whole of the Liability
Convention, represents at least a strong
stimulus for those states to try and
exercise jurisdiction over those actors,
in order inter alia to deal with
reimbursement and insurance. And
thirdly, Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty as further elaborated by the
Registration Convention, as mentioned,
offers to states a specific, spaceoriented tool to exercise some measure
of jurisdiction over a space object – for
example for any of the above reasons –
as a consequence of registering the
space object in question.
In addition, however, to these major
international legal parameters for
national legislative action, national law,
once it starts to deal with space tourism,
also inserts some further parameters in
this case largely stemming from the
experience in aviation.
From this perspective, it may be
concluded that three major issues need
to be dealt with: the craft, the crew, and
the passengers.
As for the craft, the above discussion
already to some extent indicates the
need under international law to
determine whether the craft used for
space tourism – certainly as long as
suborbital and of the SpaceShipTwomode – constitutes an aircraft or a
space object, or possibly even both.
This issue in addition however also has
some distinct national law-aspects, as
will be seen.
As for the crew and the passengers, in
respect of both the international aspects
have also been addressed above. Here,
national laws play an even more
important role than on the issue of the
craft, and from the experience of
aviation, it is clear that the distinction
between crew and craft is much more
perfected.

3.2. The United States
In the absence of any authoritative
guidance on the international level, the
United States, as the one country so far
actually having had to deal with space
tourism, by means of the Commercial
Space Launch Amendments Act of
2004 had to deal with the three issues
referred to.
With regard to the craft, the US
authorities decided for SpaceShipOne
to consider it as an experimental
aircraft, as it did with respect to its
carrier aircraft White Knight.14 By
contrast, SpaceShipTwo, it is the US
authorities’ intention, will be registered
as a spacecraft, even as the carrier is a
more or less normal aircraft and
SpaceShipTwo, like SpaceShipOne, in
its return phase will operate as a glider
and will be registered with the Federal
Aviation Administration with a code
usually reserved for aircraft.15 It
remains to be seen, of course, to what
extent this precedent will be followed
by other examples, read other countries,
with a view to the possible formation of
a rule of customary law, but it is
obvious that this US example would
tend to be followed unless solid reasons
would tell against that.
At the national level, however, the issue
of the craft has another, more down-toearth aspects as well: that of
certification. Though even in aviation
there is little harmonisation as to the
contents and detailed procedures for
certification of craft – basically, all is
left to national authorities in that
context – at least the principle of
certification is well established at the
international level, leading to an
enormous amount of certification
regulation and activity at the national
level.16 And, it should be added, in
Europe also at the regional international
level, in the context of the Joint
Aviation Authorities (JAA)17 and the
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newly established European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA)18.
In this respect it is noteworthy that,
purportedly without any obligation to
do so, Virgin Galactic with regard to its
SpaceShipTwo craft is looking for Part
25 certification for aircraft in the
United States, without however
intending to go through all the testing
normally required for that purpose.19
The Commercial Space Launch
Amendments Act itself remains silent
on the issue, but it is likely that in the
process of updating and amending or
replacing it this issue will be taken on
board prominently.
When it comes to the issue of the crew,
the Act is quite specific and defines it
as “any employee of a licensee or
transferee, or of a contractor or
subcontractor of a licensee or
transferee, who performs activities in
the course of that employment directly
relating to the launch, reentry, or other
operation of or in a launch vehicle or
reentry vehicle that carries human
beings”.20 The tourists themselves are
clearly distinguished therefrom, as
anyone on board not being a member of
the crew, by means of the term “space
flight participants”.21
As to the latter, Mr. Whitehorn, CEO of
Virgin Galactic, at his keynote speech
addressing the ECSL Practitioners’
Forum in Paris on March 17, 2006,
stated that “individual medical risks [of
passengers] now would constitute the
highest ones, not those of equipment or
vehicle failure”.22 Hence, Virgin
Galactic was developing a policy for its
SpaceShipTwo operations which would
fundamentally exclude only passengers
with cardiac or coronary weaknesses, as
well as those under sixteen years of
age.
This might still raise some issues
regarding potential (passenger) liability,
which may ultimately lead to the
establishment of a national regime on

passenger liability or even an
international convention trying to
harmonise such national regimes along
the lines of the Warsaw system in air
transport.23
For the time being, this problem has
been pushed forward in that, for
operations of this nature under the
Commercial
Space
Launch
Amendments Act, the obligation to
clearly inform passengers of the
dangers inherent in a relevant flight was
the sole relevant requirement on this
issue for obtaining a license under the
Act, effectively excluding him from
claiming any liability as a third party.24
This would leave intact, barring further
provisions to the contrary, the
application of the existing US regime
for dealing with third party liability
including international claims under
the Liability Convention. This regime,
essentially operating through a
licensing process, is well-known.
In short, it amounts to a licensing
obligation for launches conducted from
US territory and/or by US persons or
legal entities abroad, and under
circumstances also by non-US
companies if a controlling interest
would be in US hands.25 Included in
any license then is the obligation for
the licensee to either insure himself or
show “financial responsibility” up to
an amount which is the lowest of the
three following: (1) the maximum
probable loss as calculated by the
licensing authority; (2) the maximum
liability insurance available on the
world market at reasonable cost as
determined by the licensing authority;
and (3) the amount of US $
500,000,000.26
3.3. The United Kingdom
As briefly discussed, so far only the
United States has, to any appreciable
extent, drafted legislation dealing with
space tourism. That leaves the question
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open, to what extent other states would,
if not from their own national legal
perspective at least from the
international legal perspective, be
involved in space tourism, and whether
whatever law is currently in place,
would suffice for the moment to deal
with it.
The first state coming to mind is
obviously United Kingdom, in view of
the fact that Virgin Galactic, the
company closest to realizing sub-orbital
tourist flights, is still a UK company,
even as the technology is owned by a
(presumably American) joint daughter
company of Virgin Galactic and Scaled
Composites, and the operations, for the
time being, will be conducted from US
soil, in the state of New Mexico.
Virgin Galactic flights, to the extent
constituting “activities in outer space”
with reference to Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty, would certainly
trigger UK responsibility as a state. It
could even be argued that the United
Kingdom, by allowing Virgin Galactic
flights to go ahead, would come to
qualify as a state that “procures” the
launch, the notion of ‘procuring a
launch’
never
having
been
authoritatively defined. This, of course,
might entail liability for the United
Kingdom – in this case next to the
United States, qualifying as a launch
state already by reason of the launch
taking place from New Mexico.27
The United Kingdom has, indeed, a
national space law28 in place, which
provides in this regard for a license
obligation for any body “incorporated
under the law of any part of the United
Kingdom” if it undertakes the launch or
procurement of the launch of a space
object, or operates it, “whether carried
on in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere”.29
By way of exceptions, if “arrangements
have been made between the United
Kingdom and another country to secure

compliance with the international
obligations of the United Kingdom”, a
license is not required, and in addition
the UK Secretary of State may waive
the license obligation “if he is satisfied
that the requirement [of obtaining a
license] is not necessary to secure
compliance with the international
obligations of the United Kingdom”.30
Part of the license obligation finally
concerns the obligation to indemnify
the UK government in respect of any
international liability claims which the
latter had to submit to, in principle
comprehensively but in practice likely
limited to the amount of obligatory
insurance coverage.31
Thus, it seems, the United Kingdom at
least in theory seems well equipped
with the national legal means to
exercise control over any space tourism
operations in respect of which it may be
held responsible or liable on the
international level.
3.4. United Arab Emirates & Singapore
In regard of other states, it may be
pointed out that their possible
involvement in space tourist operations
seems to be considerably further away,
since the plans concerned are in
considerably less advanced stages as
compared to those of Virgin Galactic.
The plans coming closest as of yet
concern those of Space Adventures,
which is involved in projects leading to
spaceports adapted for space tourist
flights
in
the
United
Arab
Emirates/Dubai and/or Singapore.
Space Adventures itself being a US
company, it will be subject to the
aforementioned US legislation, so it is
essentially the other states mentioned
which warrant a brief look at this point.
If, indeed, such spaceport projects will
turn into successful take-off sites for
space tourist flights, the mere fact that
the territory of the United Arab
Emirates respectively Singapore might
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be used for such launches would entail
possible liability for those two state as
launching state – presuming of course,
in the light of the discussion above, the
craft in question would qualify as a
‘space object’.
Neither of these two states have any
specific national space law in place as
of yet, and it remains doubtful whether
any existing general piece of law on,
for example, the licensing of private
activities,
and/or
reimbursement
obligations vis-à-vis the government
would be effective to deal with the
matter.

objects, as well as control over space
flights”.35
In other words: a non-Russian company
like Rocketplane does not as such fall
within the licensing obligation provided
for by the Law of the Russian
Federation on Space Activities, even
though such launches may entail
liability of Russia under the prevailing
international liability regime.
The way out here for Russia may be
provided by another clause in the Law
of the Russian Federation on Space
Activities,
which
deals
with
registration: Article 17(2) namely
explicitly provides that the jurisdiction
of Russia applies also to Russianregistered space objects. This, of
course, presumes a choice on the part of
the Russian government to consider an
aircraft carrier for an upper stage space
tourist vehicle to be the launch vehicle
of a space object in the sense of the
Liability Convention – in order to cater
for any potential liability claims at the
international level: the circle is
completed here…
Moreover, it certainly requires a
Russian law somehow obliging Russian
aircraft used for the purpose of
launching
space
objects,
by
whomsoever wherever, to be registered
as such. In sum, in this case it could be
deemed rather doubtful whether the
Russian authorities have the proper
legal tools at hand to deal with the
matter.
Once the licensing obligation is made
to apply, however, the Law of the
Russian Federation on Space Activities
does provide for a reimbursement
obligation of the licensee in case of
international third party damage claims
to be honored by the Russian
government, as well as for the
likelihood that such obligation would
be without limit.36 Furthermore,
insurance against such an event for the
licensee is mandatory, although the

3.5. The Russian Federation
Furthermore,
another
company
Rocketplane plans to offer space trips
seem to consider the option of using
Russian aircraft as the lower stage
carrier for the craft which is to enter
into outer space. In that case, not only
Russian aviation law on registration
and certification of aircraft may come
into play, but in view of the inherently
resulting character of the carrier aircraft
as the “launch vehicle” also space lawconsequences result (once more, of
course, assuming that the upper stage
craft could be considered a ‘space
object’). Such a character, namely,
would qualify Russia (also) as a
launching state in the context of the
Liability Convention.32
That brings into the picture the national
space law which Russia has enacted
over a decade ago.33 The Law of the
Russian Federation on Space Activities
provides for a licensing obligation for
all “organizations and citizens of the
Russian Federation or (…) foreign
organizations and citizens under the
[territorial] jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation”.34 This licensing obligation
ratione materiae applies to space
activities, including “preparation for
launching and launching of space
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maximum amount of obligatory cover
is to be determined by future
legislation, which very likely therefore
will mean such an amount will be
limited.37

at this moment is the only state more or
less immediately confronted with space
tourist operations.
Yet, if we accept the fundamental
premise that space tourism can
contribute to the overall benefits
mankind would draw from space and
space activities (for instance by making
access to space much cheaper and
safer) these are important issues for
further analysis in the forthcoming
years – and not just by American
lawyers, since from the one end US
legal developments may have a
profound impact on any international
legal developments, and from the other
end such developments should not lead
to any unnecessary conflict with the
established body of international space
law either. In that sense, there is not
only space for tourism, but also space
for further discussion.

4. Concluding remarks
It is clear that within the scope of the
present paper it has not been possible
even summarily to deal with all
important legal issues – which in itself
testifies that space tourism is a rather
interesting new phenomenon in space
law if it is, indeed, to stay. This in turn
raised the overarching question: is
(there) space for tourism also in a legal
sense?
The current, summary overview seems
to answer this question largely in the
affirmative: space tourism certainly is
not prohibited by any of the relevant
treaties, at least as long as the specific
relevant rules and obligations contained
therein are complied with.
Here, however, the first major issues
arise. On a number of counts, too little
clarity exists as to the precise impact of
international space law on this new
phenomenon. In turn, this gives rise to
the fact of life that those states which
find themselves confronted with
relevant space tourist activities will of
necessity find their own particular way
in dealing with, for example,
certification of craft or liability of
operators. In addition, specific national
idiosyncrasies may also creep in.
This is not to say that there is,
necessarily, a need right now for any
international convention – history has
shown, that such efforts are too often
ill-fated and/or extraordinarily slow if
there is no general consensus on their
desirability or need. For the time being,
moreover, it will be most interesting to
closely follow national US law
developments, since the United States
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